Fifteen reportable judgments across the 9 to 12 November 2026 upload window (Sunday 8 November excluded), with stragglers swept from 7 November — three from the Federal Constitutional Court, five from the Supreme Court, four from the Lahore High Court and three from the Sindh High Court (the Islamabad High Court returned no in-window entries for a fourth consecutive window).
Federal Constitutional Court of Pakistan
- Khaliq Dad v. Capital Development Authority — the most comprehensive recent statement on CDA land acquisitions: a lawfully announced and final award binds both the affected persons and the acquiring authority reciprocally, and neither delay nor appreciation in market value can reopen it; compensation is distinct from rehabilitation benefits, an administrative policy cannot override the parent Ordinance, and the Federal Government’s power to issue policy directions under section 4(2) does not extend to determining individual claims or reopening concluded awards. CDA petitions converted into appeals and allowed to the extent indicated, with the CDA directed to satisfy established entitlements within six months.
- M/s Pacific Exim v. Federation of Pakistan — the review petitions against the judgment upholding the super tax under sections 4B and 4C of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 are dismissed: review is an exceptional jurisdiction confined to error apparent on the face of the record, not a disguised appeal, and the levy’s legislative competence under Entry 47, its retrospective operation and its application to separate and final regimes were all comprehensively adjudicated. The Court also holds that, following the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, it exercises independent constitutional jurisdiction and Supreme Court judgments carry persuasive value only, so divergence of opinion is no ground for review.
- Iqrar Haider v. Member (Consolidation), Board of Revenue — the Collector’s discretion under section 10(3) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 over a horse-breeding tenancy must be exercised on relevant considerations and gives due weight to the District Remount Officer’s technical recommendation, departure requiring cogent reasons; before resuming a tenancy for breach, section 24 requires an opportunity to object and, where the breach is rectifiable, written notice of not less than one month. Petition converted into appeal and allowed; the allotment to the petitioner restored.
Supreme Court of Pakistan
- M/s Yarn Kings v. Commissioner Inland Revenue — for tax periods commencing 1 July 2017, the zero-rating of supplies to the five export-oriented sectors under S.R.O. 1125(I)/2011 did not of itself exclude further tax under section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act 1990 on supplies to unregistered persons; after the Finance Act 2017 amendments to sections 3(1A) and 4, zero-rating prescribes a rate but does not remove a supply from the taxable category, and an exclusion from further tax must be traced to an exercise of the proviso to section 3(1A). Departmental petitions converted into appeals and allowed; taxpayers’ petitions dismissed.
- Gul Nawab v. The State — section 59(5) of the Prisons Act 1894 is an unyielding statutory floor: no system of marks or administrative remission can reduce a life sentence to actual custody of less than fifteen years, and a provincial omission of that bar from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prisons Rules 2018 is of no effect; presidential remission under Article 45 is inviolable, so it is the general prison-rule remissions that must be pared back. The appellant’s release after about nine years is declared without lawful authority and he is ordered back into custody, with section 400 CrPC revived as a tool of judicial oversight and the judgment circulated nationwide.
- M/s Zarai Taraqiati Bank v. Federation of Pakistan — in the context of the SOE appeal provisions inserted into section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 by the Income Tax (Amendment) Act 2026, “wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by the Federal Government” is read strictly and literally, the de minimis maxim having no application where a judicial remedy is at stake; shares held by the State Bank count as indirectly federal, but the vanishingly small provincial shareholdings are decisive, the Federation and the Provinces being legally distinct and section 121 of the Companies Act 2017 barring notice of any trust. Preliminary objection dismissed; appeals held maintainable.
- Umar Draz v. The State — section 84 PPC distinguishes medical insanity from legal insanity, and a Medical Board opinion that a disorder at the relevant time “cannot be ruled out” is not by itself conclusive; but the accused’s burden is lighter than the prosecution’s, and where bipolar disorder is inherently episodic and two real brothers were independently diagnosed, the material created a reasonable doubt as to capacity. Appeal allowed; the death sentences under section 295-C set aside and the appellants acquitted after some twenty years in custody.
- Liberty Mills v. Muslim Cotton Mills — failure to issue notice under Order XXI Rule 66(2) CPC before drawing up the proclamation of sale is an irregularity, not a nullity, whose consequences fall to be assessed under Order XXI Rule 90 on proof of substantial injury; a judgment-debtor aware of the execution proceedings who stays away cannot complain, and a ground omitted from the Rule 90 application cannot be raised for the first time in appeal. Civil appeal allowed in part and the connected petition dismissed; the confirmed sale maintained.
Lahore High Court
- Irfan alias Kala v. The State — refusal to engage private counsel is not the same as relinquishing the right of cross-examination, and a recorded opportunity is not conclusive proof of an informed waiver; the Article 10-A fair-trial guarantee is substantive, section 342 CrPC is no substitute for cross-examination, and section 14 of the Punjab Legal Aid Act 2018 obliges every court to inform an undefended indigent accused of his right to legal aid. Revision allowed; convictions set aside and the case remanded for retrial from the stage of prosecution evidence.
- Nadeem Masih v. Additional Director General, FIA — no mandamus lies to compel the FIA to register a case of custodial torture: under section 5(1) of the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment) Act 2022 the FIA has exclusive jurisdiction, overseen by the National Commission for Human Rights, and registration follows a designated authority’s reasoned decision under the 2002 Rules rather than section 154 CrPC; compliance proceedings are confined to the four corners of the order enforced. Petition dismissed, with liberty to file a private complaint before the Court of Sessions.
- The University of Faisalabad v. Federation of Pakistan — a conjoint reading of the Preamble and sections 6, 9 and 20(7) and (8) of the PM&DC Act confers authority to scrutinise, regulate and determine the tuition fee of private medical and dental institutions, including permissible caps; a power to “regulate” is plenary absent restrictive words, and the fee framework survives proportionality review under Article 18 and does not offend Article 25. Institutions’ petitions dismissed; students’ petitions allowed with directions to implement the capping notifications and the per-student refunds.
- Masood Ahmad v. Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue — the Government, as owner of state land, may define and convert the purpose for which its land is used, and that decision cannot be made subject to the claims of a person in unauthorised occupation; tentative observations in an order that dismissed an earlier petition create no vested right, and an illegal occupant shown as such in the revenue record is not an aggrieved person entitled to constitutional relief. Intra-court appeal dismissed.
Sindh High Court
- M/s Apna TV Channel v. Commissioner (Appeals), SRB — a public service message telecast for consideration is the taxable service of advertisement on television under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act 2011, taxability not turning on the content of the message; and a withholding regime is machinery for collection, not a transfer of the charge, so the provider remains liable under section 9(1) save to the extent tax was actually deducted and deposited, personal liability of a defaulting withholding agent having been introduced only in 2019. Reference answered against the applicant and dismissed.
- Commissioner Inland Revenue v. M/s Mapak Edible Oils — in computing the tax credit under section 65E(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 for an industrial undertaking established before 1 July 2011, retained earnings and accumulated or unappropriated profits form part of “total equity” and are not excluded in favour of paid-up capital alone; a later-inserted sub-section directed to a different measure does not colour the governing text, and the canons favouring the subject or construing exemptions strictly are residual. Reference disposed of; the Tribunal’s order modified on the total-equity question.
- M/s Mackinnon Mackenzie v. Commissioner Inland Revenue — for tax year 2009, section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 applies as it stood at the close of that year, and the amendments made by the Finance (Amendment) Ordinance 2009 could not furnish the power to select for audit; but the citation of an inapplicable amended provision does not vitiate a selection the unamended text independently permitted, where the power exercised lies within the words common to both and no prejudice is shown. Reference dismissed; the Tribunal’s finding on selection for audit maintained.
